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UNITED KINGDOM COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 
 
Dr Paul Arnell and Mr Diego Quiroz-Onate 
18/11/2009 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of questions have been raised over the United Kingdom’s compliance with its 
international obligations in the area of bribery and corruption. These generally have arisen 
following national and international developments in the area. In the United Kingdom the 
most recent have been the inclusion of the Bribery Bill1 in the Queen’s Speech and the decision 
of the Serious Fraud Office to seek permission to prosecute BAE Systems. Prior germane 
developments include the decision of House of Lords in the BAE Systems litigation 
concerning arms sales to Saudi Arabia2 and the publication of the Law Commission for 
England and Wales’ Draft Bribery Bill and accompanying Report.3 There has also been 
the first conviction for foreign bribery in United Kingdom law.4 Internationally, recent 
developments include the OECD’s Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.5 More generally, the 
first anti-corruption treaty of global application was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in October 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003.6 A 
number of regional conventions, resolutions and recommendations of an international nature 
have also been concluded. These developments are of course related - United Kingdom law 
does not develop in a vacuum. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, for 
example, extended the English and Scottish common law offences of bribery to acts 
occurring outside the United Kingdom - ostensibly to comply with the OECD Convention.7
 
 
Clearly there have been a number of important developments nationally and internationally. 
The specific issues arising from national and international developments in the area 
coalesce into one basic question – whether the United Kingdom is in overall compliance 
with its international obligations. Examination of this requires firstly a definition of the 
relevant terms and a statement of the international law and principles. These provide the 
standards against which United Kingdom law and practice is measured. Of course an 
iteration of the germane United Kingdom law is required, and this follows the description 
of international law. Subsequently, an analysis of United Kingdom law against 
international law takes place under two heads; substantive law and enforcement. Under the 
head of substantive law three areas are examined; preventative rules and policies, 
substantive criminal prescription and procedural co-operation. Under the head of 
enforcement an overall general analysis is followed by an examination of the proceedings 
                                                          
1 The Draft Bribery Bill is cited at. http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/draft-bribery-bill.pdf. 
2 The House of Lords case is R (Corner House Research and another) v Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office (Justice Intervening), [1008] UKHL 60. The Divisional Court's decision is The Queen on the 
Application of Corner House Research and Campaign Against Arms Trade v The Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office, [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). See also Williams, S., The BAE/Saudi Al Yamamah 
Contracts: Implications in Law and Public Procurement, (2008) 57 ICLQ 200. 
3 Cited at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/bribery.htm. 
4 Ibid at para 11. 
5 OECD Working Group of Bribery in International Business Transactions, Report of the Application of 
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and the  Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
Phase 2bis, 16 October 2008, cited at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf.. The OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
1997 itself is cited at < http://www.oecd.org/>, hereinafter the OECD Convention. 
6 Cited at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html. It entered into force 14 Dec. 2005 
following the ratification by 30 states. Hereinafter the UN Convention.  
7 Section 108(1), for example, states “For the purposes of any common law offence of bribery it is 
immaterial if the functions of the person who receives or is offered a reward have no connection with 
the United Kingdom and are carried out in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.” 
surrounding the attempts to prosecute BAE Systems. A conclusion will then be drawn 
stating that whilst the United Kingdom appears to comply with the letter of international 
law it fails to give effect to its spirit.  
 
TERMS DEFINED  
 
The two central terms are “bribery” and “corruption”, with the former normally being conceived 
as a type of the latter. Bribery, being more specific, has been defined in various ways. There are 
however relatively few definitions of corruption. The UN Convention, for example, defines 
“bribery” but not “corruption”. Bribery here is defined in three contexts; national public sector, 
international or foreign public sector and private sector. Article 15 covers the first, it states: 
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering 
or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official 
himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance 
by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official 
himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties”. 
This definition covers both the giving and promise of an inducement to act (called active bribery) 
and the acceptance or solicitation of one (passive bribery).8 The Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption classifies bribery according to the sector in which it takes 
place as well through the identification of certain recipients – such as judges – in ten 
separate articles. 9
“... it seemed difficult to arrive at a common definition and it was rightly said, ‘no 
definition of corruption will be equally accepted in every nation’. Possible definitions 
have been discussed for a number of years in different fora but it has not been possible 
for the international community to agree to on a common definition. Instead international 
fora have preferred to concentrate on the definition of certain forms of corruption, e.g. 
“illicit payments” (UN), “bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions” (OECD), “corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of Member States of the European Union” (EU).
 These specifically mention active and passive bribery and apply to both the 
public and private sectors. In regard to “corruption” the Explanatory Report of the Council of 
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption states:  
10
One of the few internationally pronounced definitions of corruption is found in the Council of 
Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999. It states “For the purpose of this Convention, 
“corruption” means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any 
other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or 
behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof”.
 
11 
Corruption here is conceived as largely synonymous with bribery.12 The UN Convention, in 
contrast, conceives of corruption in a much wider sense. It covers in addition to bribery 
embezzlement and misappropriation, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit 
enrichment and laundering the proceeds of crime.13
                                                          
8 The OECD Convention, in contrast and as its full title indicates, is limited to the active bribery of 
public officials. Article 1(1) inter alia provides that state parties make an offence for any person to 
intentionally “...  offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly 
or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or 
retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”. 
 Within United Kingdom law the Anti-
9 Cited at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm. Hereinafter the Council of 
Europe Convention. The article relating to the bribery of judges is article 11.  
10 At para 2, cited at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/173.htm.  
11 Cited at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm. 
12 Bribery has been said to be “... one form of corruption, a loss of purity and purpose, a social 
decomposition” in Johnson's Dictionary (1775), cited in Johnstone, P. and Brown, G., International 
controls of corruption: recent responses from the USA and the UK, (2004) 11 Journal of Financial 
Crime 217.  
13 In articles 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23 respectively. "Corruption" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "An 
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 denotes as “corruption offences” the common law crime 
of bribery and the central offences under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, discussed below. The approach that will be adopted presently 
is in accordance with this practice – with corruption being the broad term that includes bribery 
and other related acts.  
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The United Kingdom is party to three treaties in the area of corruption and bribery. These are the 
OECD Convention, Council of Europe Convention and the UN Convention14 - each of these 
place obligations upon the United Kingdom. Also perhaps placing obligations upon the United 
Kingdom in the area is customary international law. The OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was signed by OECD 
members and five other states, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic on 17 
December 1997.15 There are presently 37 state parties. The Convention entered into force 15 
February 1999. The United Kingdom ratified the convention on 14 December 1998. The 
particular membership of the Convention, including the leading industrial states, arguably 
enhances its significance. As noted the “... importance of the OECD Convention is instilled by 
its potent membership, which encompasses all of the world’s major economic powers and 
binds all companies doing business out of those countries”.16
 
 The preamble to the Convention 
indicates its focus. It inter alia provides that the parties “... consider that bribery is a widespread 
phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade and investment which raises 
serious moral and political concerns, undermines good governance and economic development 
and distorts international competitive condition”. The central obligation in the Convention is 
found in article 1(1). It provides that each party “... shall takes such measures as may be necessary 
to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise 
or give any undue pressure or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain 
from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business 
or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”. In other words the 
Convention centres on, and is limited to, the active bribery of public officials. As will be seen 
below, this obligation is less than that required by the other two conventions.   
Befitting its comparatively limited ambitions the OECD Convention is relatively short - 
comprised of 17 articles. Article 1 is noted above. Article 2 requires state parties to establish the 
liability of legal persons - if possible within their legal system. Article 3 covers sanctions and 
requires state parties to attach effective penalties to the crime of bribery of foreign officials. 
Article 4 mandates state parties to establish jurisdiction where the offence is committed in whole 
or part within its territory, and where that party applies its jurisdiction on the basis of nationality, 
to extend that jurisdiction to the crime. Article 5 is particularly relevant – in light of its place 
in the BAE proceedings. It relates to prosecution and the inapplicability of possible bars 
thereto: 
“Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be subject 
to the applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall not be influenced by 
considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with 
another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved”. 
As will be discussed below, the nature and applicability of this provision was the focus of certain 
criticisms arising from the attempted prosecution of BAE. Further relevant provisions are article 8 
                                                                                                                                                                       
act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. The 
act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure 
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others". Black's Law 
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing, St Paul, 1990. 
14 Noteworthy but not directly relevant, is the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
1999, supra note 11.  
15 See generally Corr, C. F., and Lawler, J., Damned If You Do. Damned If You Don't? The OECD 
Convention and the Globalisation of Anti-Bribery Measures, (1999) 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l Law 1249. 
16 Ibid at p 1296. 
restricting inter alia “off-the-book” accounts, article 9 concerning mutual legal assistance and 
article 10 pertaining to extradition. Finally, article 11 requires a responsible authority to be 
nominated to the Secretary-General of the OECD and article 12 stipulates that the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions is charged with monitoring and 
following-up the Convention.17
 
 This Committee has been one of the main sources of criticism of 
United Kingdom practice, mentioned below.    
The second treaty to which the United Kingdom is party containing obligations in the area of 
bribery and corruption is the UN Convention. It contrasts sharply with the OECD Convention on 
account of its coverage and detail and its geographical scope. The wide subject-matter of the 
treaty leads to a greater number and variety of obligations being placed upon the United 
Kingdom. Geographically, the UN Convention is the only bribery and corruption-specific legal 
instrument with universal application.18
 
 It has 140 signatories and 122 state parties, and entered 
into force 15 December 2005. The United Kingdom ratified the treaty 14 February 2006. The 
intentions of the parties are found in its preamble, which inter alia states that they are 
convinced “... that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that 
affects all societies and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and control it 
essential”. Further, it provides that states bear in mind that “... the prevention and 
eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all States and that they must cooperate with one 
another, with the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sector, 
such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, if 
their efforts in this area are to be effective”. Clearly the framers of the UN Convention thought 
a comprehensive and global approach was required. As seen below, the treaty extends beyond 
requiring the criminalisation and includes preventative and procedural co-operation 
obligations as well.   
The breadth of UN Convention is illustrated by it comprising eight separate parts and 71 articles. 
The six core parts cover preventative measures, criminalisation and law enforcement, international 
cooperation, asset recovery, technical assistance and information exchange and mechanisms for 
enforcement.19
 
 For our present purposes several provisions are particularly relevant. These 
relate to criminalisation, prosecution and specialised authorities. Article 15 mandates the 
criminalisation of the bribery of public officials. Article 30 governs prosecution. It provides, in 
article 30(3), that “Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal 
powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in 
accordance with this Convention are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement 
measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission 
of such offences”. Further, article 30(9) states “Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect 
the principle that the description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention 
and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the lawfulness of 
conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted 
and punished in accordance with that law”. Article 34 provides for the creation of an 
independent anti-corruption authority. It in part provides “Each State Party shall, in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body 
or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or 
bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively 
and without any undue influence”. As will be seen below, each of these provisions relate to an 
area that demands examination when adjudging United Kingdom compliance with the 
Convention. 
                                                          
17 The specifics of relevant articles in this and the other treaties will be mentioned below when tested 
against law and practice in the United Kingdom. 
18 See generally Carr, I., Fighting Corruption Through the United Nations Convention on Corruption 2003: 
A Global Solution to a Global Problem?. 2005 International Trade Law and Regulation 24, and Webb, P., 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: global achievement or missed opportunity?, (2005) 8 
Journal of International Economic Law 191. 
19 In Parts II to VII respectively. 
The third corruption-specific treaty to which the United Kingdom is party is the Council of 
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Its content is narrow and limited – especially 
in contrast with the UN Convention. It has 53 state parties, including six states who are not 
members of the Council of Europe. The United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification 9 
December 2003.20 The preamble of the Council of Europe Convention emphasises the urgency of 
the problem of corruption. It inter alia provides “Convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of 
priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against corruption, 
including the adoption of appropriate legislation and preventive measures”. The Council of 
Europe Convention is interesting in part because, unlike the OECD and UN Conventions, there is 
no explicit stipulation regarding prosecution. In line with the UN Convention though, it 
requires the creation of an independent specialised agency to investigate cases of corruption. In 
regard to which article 20 states “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption. They shall have the 
necessary independence in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of 
the Party, in order for them to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any 
undue pressure. The Party shall ensure that the staff of such entities has adequate training and 
financial resources for their tasks”.21
 
 Clearly, there is an overlap here with the other conventions. 
Cumulatively, the three instruments comprise a relatively wide range of obligations incumbent 
upon the United Kingdom. They may not, however, be the only form of international law in the 
area. 
Norms of customary international law relating to bribery and corruption may add to the body of 
international law against which United Kingdom law and practice must be measured. Clearly there 
are a number of instances of “soft-law” in the area. Amongst these are the International Chamber 
of Commerce’s Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business 
Transactions22, the United Nations’ Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions23, the Council of Europe’s Twenty Guiding Principles 
for the Fight Against Corruption24 and the OECD’s Recommendation on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions.25 The question that arises from the existence of these 
(and other) statements is what, if any, obligatory effect they have upon the United Kingdom. 
In other words, it is possible to construct the argument that the crime of bribery has attained 
the stature of international crime – one prescribed by customary international law itself. If this 
is the case the crime would attract universal jurisdiction and international law would allow all 
states having custody of person alleged to have committed the act to exercise jurisdiction. 
Further, one could argue that customary international law has developed to not only allow 
states to try and punish those involved in bribery but to require it (or extradite the individual to 
a jurisdiction that is willing – the aut dedere aut judicare principle). A proponent of this view is 
Bantekas, who writes “From an international law point of view it is important to comprehend 
that the recognition by the 1997 Convention of bribery as a transnational offence means that 
the offender incurs criminal responsibility not only under national law but also international 
law”.26
                                                          
20 At which time the United Kingdom made a reservation, discussed below.  
 With respect, it is submitted that bribery remains an offence within the municipal law 
of states alone, albeit one affected by international regulation. There is simply not sufficient 
state practice to justify the view that it is a crime by customary international law. This is not to 
suggest that numerous states have not criminalised the crime within their domestic law, indeed 
many states have done just that. It is because states largely fail to provide that the crime of 
21 See further Lord Woolf, Business Ethics, Global Companies and the Defence Industry – Ethical Business 
Conduct in BAE Systems plc – The Way Forward, May 2008, cited at 
http://production.investis.com/investors/woolf/, Appendix I, paras 17-18. Additional non-United Kingdom 
provision in the area of corruption emanates from the EU, which has adopted several instruments in the area. 
As this largely relates to corruption within and against EU institutions it is excluded from this analysis. 
22 Cited at http://www.iccwbo.org. 
23 UN Doc GA A/Res/51/191, cited at http://www.un.org.. 
24 Cited at http://www.coe.int.  
25 Cited at http://www.oecd.org.  
26Bantekas, I., Corruption as an International Crime and Crime Against Humanity: an Outline of 
Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 466 at p 
470. 
bribery is to subject to universal jurisdiction – as they have, for example, in regard to torture 
and genocide. It is correct to conclude, then, that the full extent of international legal 
obligations upon the United Kingdom in the area of bribery and corruption emanate from, and 
only from, the treaties to which it is a party.27
 
 They provide the yardstick against which United 
Kingdom law and practice must be measured.  
UNITED KINGDOM LAW 
 
It is interesting and telling that the crime of bribery in the United Kingdom28 pre-dates international 
proscription by some considerable time – the law has therefore developed organically and in the 
absence of international context. The crime exists both at common law and in statute. At common 
law in England and Wales bribery is generally accepted to be “... the receiving or offering [of] 
any undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his 
behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and 
integrity”.29 In Scotland the crime is more limited, entailing a bribe and attempt to bribe a 
judicial officer and for the officer himself to take a bribe.30 In regard to Scotland it has been 
noted that the crime “... is always prosecuted nowadays under statute, as are all other aspects of 
corrupt behaviour”.31 The common law offences have been given explicit extraterritorial affect – 
as a result of international law - under ss 109(2) and 108(1) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 in regard to England and Wales and ss 69(2) and 68(1) of the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2003 in Scotland.32 These sections make it immaterial for the purposes of the 
common law crimes of bribery the fact that the acts occur outside the United Kingdom and that the 
persons who receive or are offered a reward have no connection with the United Kingdom. 
Interestingly, in light of the putative deficiencies in the area of corporate liability, discussed below, 
ss 109 of the 2001 Act and 69 of the 2003 Act allow for this, with s 69 also including a Scottish 
partnership.33
 
 
The applicable statutory provision in both England and Wales and Scotland again pre-dates 
international law. It generally comprises the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916.34
“Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person 
corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive, for himself or for any other person, 
any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage whatever as an inducement to, or reward for, or 
otherwise on account of any member, officer, or servant of a public body as in this Act 
defined, doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction 
whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which the said public body is concerned, shall be 
guilty of [an offence]”. 
 Section 1(1) 
of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 inter alia prescribes passive bribery, providing: 
Active bribery, the giving or promising of a bribe, is covered by s 1(2) of the 1889 Act. It 
provides: 
“Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person 
corruptly give, promise, or offer any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage whatsoever 
to any person, whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, as an 
                                                          
27 Of course it is possible to argue that bribery as a crime is in the process of becoming a crime within 
customary international law.  
28 The criminal law of England and Wales and Scotland are, of course, distinct. The germane statutory 
crimes are generally applicable in both jurisdictions whilst there are differences in the common law 
definitions of the crime of bribery, see below.  
29 Russell On Crime, 12th Edition, Stevens, London, 1964, p 381. 
30 Hume Commentaries 1, 407, 408. See further Arnell, P. The Crime of Bribery in Scotland, (2009) 1 
SLT 1.  
31 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 15 Reissue, para 400. 
32 This was done to give effect to the OECD Convention, see the Woolf Report, supra note 20, Appendix 
1, para 4. The only other explicit substantive change to United Kingdom law pursuant to the three 
conventions was made in regard to the seizure of property connected with offences of corruption by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to comply with the UN Convention, see below note 45. 
33 See below for discussion of the liability of legal persons.  
34 Mentioned below are prescriptions covering specific categories of offenders or situations. 
inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of any member, officer, or 
servant of any public body as in this Act defined, doing or forbearing to do anything in 
respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which such 
public body as aforesaid is concerned, shall be guilty of [an offence].” 
The definition of “public body” was firstly extended from its original meaning of local public 
bodies in the United Kingdom to “local and public authorities of all descriptions” by s 4(2) of 
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. Then, as with the common law crimes of bribery, the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extended the application of this crime outside the 
United Kingdom, to all equivalent public bodies by s 108(3). 
 
The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 was a reaction to a domestic call to extend the law 
of corruption to the private sector.35
“If any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from 
any person, for himself or for any other person, any gift or consideration as an 
inducement or regard for doing or forbearing to do, or for having after the passing o 
this Act done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principals affairs or business, 
or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his 
principal's affairs or business... he shall be guilty of an offence”.
 Section 1(1) inter alia provides: 
36
Section 108(2) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 inserts a new section 
1(4) into the 1906 Act which provides it is immaterial for the purposes of this Act that “... 
the principal's affairs or business have no connection with the United Kingdom and are 
conducted in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom and (b) the agent's 
functions have no connection with the United Kingdom and are carried out in a country 
or territory outside the United Kingdom”. In regard to prescriptions in both the 1889 Act 
and 1906 Act the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 creates a presumption of corruption. 
This is to the effect of shifting the burden of proof where there is an allegation of 
corruption onto the defence to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that a given 
payment was not corrupt.
 
37 This presumption is limited to payments to employees of 
public bodies involving contracts.38
 
  
It has been seen above that the international bribery and corruption-related obligations upon the 
United Kingdom extend beyond the criminalisation of bribery itself. Proscription of various 
tangential acts and specifics of investigation and prosecution in England and Wales and Scotland 
are also required by international law.39 Amongst the domestic offences that putatively satisfy 
international obligation are offences under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 relating to the concealment 
or transfer criminal property. The definition of criminal property by s 340(3) and (9) of the Act 
includes that property which arises from criminal conduct, which includes a bribe.40 Also relevant 
under the same Act are the offences relating to money laundering found in ss 327 – 329 as 
amended - mentioned below. Further, there are the corruption-related offences in regard to the sale 
of honours and offices, the conduct of elections and false accounting.41
                                                          
35 See Fennell, P., and Thomas, P.A., Corruption in England and Wales: An Historical Analysis, (1983) 
11 International Journal of Sociology and Law, 167 at p 174.  
 Whilst not directed at 
general bribery per se, these offences are relevant in that they satisfy certain other bribery-related 
international obligations. An example being the obligation in article 4 of the Council of Europe 
Convention, requiring the criminalisation of bribery of members of domestic public assemblies. A 
36 The giving and offering of a gift, consideration, inducement and reward is prescribed by the same 
section.  
37 By s 2.  
38 Carr-Briant, [1943] KB 607. The presumption of corruption does not apply to cases of extended 
jurisdiction under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, by s 110. Interestingly it is not 
excluded by the corresponding provision relating to Scotland, the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. 
See generally the Law Commission for England and Wales November 2007 Report, supra note 3, paras 
2.7 – 2.25.  
39 Interestingly, certain civil rules are also relevant. The Woolf Report refers to certain contractual and 
agency rules affecting cases of bribery and corruption, supra note 20 at paras 35-36.   
40 See further Woolf Report, supra note 20, Appendix 1 at paras 28-29. 
41 Including under the Sale of Offices Act 1809, the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925 and the 
Representation of the People Act 1983. See the Woolf Report, supra note 20 at para 34.  
relevant non-criminal provision is s 577A of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, as 
inserted by the Finance Act 1993. This provides that all expenditure which constitutes a criminal 
offence is not tax-deductible in the computation of taxable profits, with a conviction not necessary 
to exclude deductibility. This is in line with the OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility 
of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 1996.42
 
  
United Kingdom enforcement and international criminal co-operation law and practice are as 
important as the substantive criminal law in reaching a conclusion on United Kingdom compliance 
with international law. All three of the treaties described above require more than the 
criminalisation of bribery. They oblige parties to investigate and prosecute acts of bribery and to 
co-operate internationally. In regard to investigation and prosecution all three conventions stipulate 
that a specialised agency be created or nominated to carry out the task. In England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland it is the Serious Fraud Office that is charged with investigating and prosecuting 
cases of alleged bribery and corruption.43
“(3) The Director may investigate any suspected offence which appears to him on 
reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud.  
 It was established by s 1(1) Criminal Justice Act 1987, 
and commenced its operation in April 1988. The remit of the SFO is provided by s 1(3) – 1(5), 
which provide: 
(4) The Director may, if he thinks fit, conduct any such investigation in conjunction 
either with the police or with any other person who is, in the opinion of the Director, a 
proper person to be concerned in it.  
(5) The Director may— 
(a) institute and have the conduct of any criminal proceedings which appear to him to 
relate to such fraud; and 
(b) take over the conduct of any such proceedings at any stage.” 
In Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Service, headed by the Lord Advocate, 
undertakes criminal prosecutions. Whilst there is not a dedicated prosecutorial authority, s. 27 of 
the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 provides that where it appears to the Lord 
Advocate that a suspected offence may involve serious or complex fraud she may nominate any 
person either generally or in regard to a specific case to investigate the situation. In regard to 
international co-operation, there are two central statutes, the Criminal Justice (International Co-
operation) Act 1990 and the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003.44
 
 These will be 
mentioned below in adjudging United Kingdom compliance.  
UNITED KINGDOM COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW    
 
Analysis of United Kingdom compliance with international law in the area of bribery and 
corruption must examine the germane substantive law and the enforcement practices pursuant 
thereto. These are distinct but related examinations, and they need not result in similar 
conclusions. For example, the United Kingdom may well satisfy international law by containing 
appropriate substantive law yet be in contravention of it by failing to meet investigative and 
prosecutorial obligations. Indeed, this is prima facie the case. United Kingdom law appears to 
generally meet the requirements of international law substantively (or there have been 
reservations made)45
                                                          
42 Cited at 
 with criticisms have focusing upon the enforcement of that law. In regard 
to the former point and referring to the UN Convention, Jack Straw has stated that United 
Kingdom law “… became fully compliant with the convention when the Criminal Justice 
(International Co-operation) Act 1990 (Enforcement of Overseas Forfeiture Orders) Order 2005 
http://www.oecd.org/.  
43 Its website is found at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/.  
44 These will be discussed below. They exist in addition to specific provision in regard to international 
co-operation, for example found in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s 141 relating to the enforcement of 
the Act where there is relevant property outwith the United Kingdom.  
45 Although perhaps trite to note, the United Kingdom is bound to abide by its international obligations 
under the general pacta sunt sevanda rule of international law. Additionally, however, the UN 
Convention, in article 65, provides that state parties shall take the necessary measures, including 
legislative and administrative measures… to ensure the implementation of its obligations…”. 
came into force on the 31 December, and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and 
Orders) Order 2005 came into effect on 1 January 2006”.46 More generally in regard to 
substantive compliance, in all jurisdictions of the United Kingdom bribery and corruption are 
unlawful and authorities have been charged with investigating and prosecuting them. On the 
other hand, there have been a number of criticisms surrounding enforcement of the law. What 
is necessary, therefore, is a compartmentalisation of analysis. A division firstly into the two 
broad heads of the substantive law and enforcement is required. Under the head of substantive 
law analysis takes place according to the three areas in which the United Kingdom is obligated 
to act; prevention, criminalisation and co-operation.47
 
 In regard to enforcement, firstly takes place 
in the abstract and then is aided by examination of the facts and law surrounding the attempts to 
prosecute BAE Systems. 
PREVENTATIVE RULES AND POLICIES 
 
The UN Convention is the most comprehensive corruption-related agreement to which the United 
Kingdom is party, containing provision in the area of the prevention of corruption and bribery. 
This is found in Chapter II, containing ten articles, entitled “Preventative Measures”. The OECD 
Convention and Council of Europe Convention, in contrast, contain no specific and direct 
prevention-related provision. The articles relating to prevention in the UN Convention begin 
with a general obligation in article 5(1). It inter alia provides: “Each State Party shall, in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain 
effective, co-ordinated anti-corruption policies...”. Significantly, in terms of measuring 
compliance, it is important to note that a number of the preventative obligations (and indeed 
others) are couched in non-obligatory terms. “In accordance with the fundamental principles of its 
legal system” qualifies the obligation and permits variation and exception. Further, for example, 
article 5(3) states “Each state party shall endeavour to periodically evaluate relevant legal 
instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and 
fight corruption”. Here “shall endeavour” materially qualifies the obligation. Similarly, articles 7 
and 8 require state parties to endeavour to prevent corruption in the public sector. Overall, the 
United Kingdom appears to comply with these obligations. In addition to generally attempting 
to address bribery and corruption it inter alia has adopted and applies the Civil Service Code, 
published June 2006. The Civil Service Code inter alia provides that civil servants must not 
“… misuse your official position, for example by using information acquired in the course of 
your official duties to further your private interests or those of others [and] accept gifts or 
hospitality or receive other benefits from anyone which might reasonably be seen to 
compromise your personal judgement or integrity”.48
 
  
The UN Convention contains further preventative measures in regard to public procurement, 
transparency, freedom of information and judicial independence. The obligation in regard to 
public procurement, in article 9, inter alia provides that state parties “... shall, in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of its legal system, take the necessary steps to establish 
appropriate systems of procurement... that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption”. 
The United Kingdom complies with this article in part through the presence within its law of 
the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, and the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006, 
which govern public procurement. These implement the relevant European Union rules on 
public procurement. These specific rules, and the general European Union Treaty obligations 
                                                          
46 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release upon United Kingdom ratification 14 February 
2006, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2006/02/fco_npr_140206_uncac. This 
legislation followed the Government’s understanding that the only primary legislation that was required 
following ratification was in order to comply with article 31(1)(b) of the UN Convention See Explanatory 
Memorandum on the UN Convention against Corruption, Command Paper No. 6854, Nov. 2005, cited 
at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/treaty-command-papers-ems/explanatory-
memoranda/explanatory-memoranda-2005/corruption. Article 31(1)(b) requires each state party to take, 
to the greatest extent possible within its legal system, such measures to enable confiscation of “(b) 
Property, equipment, or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences established in 
accordance with this Convention”. 
47 These three heads mirrors those used in Carr’s analysis of the UN Convention, supra note 17. 
48 Cited at http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/iam/codes/cscode/index.asp. 
in regard to procurement are said to be based on the fundamental principles of transparency, 
equal treatment and non-discrimination and proportionality.49
 
 Articles 10 and 13 of the UN 
Convention relate to the freedom of information and the enhancement of transparency in 
public administration. In regard to the former, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the 
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 satisfy the requirements of article 10. Article 11 
requires state parties to take measures to inter alia strengthen judicial integrity and 
independence. Again this obligation is couched in non-obligatory terms. However, even were 
it not, the United Kingdom appears to comply in part by formalising the judicial appointment 
process, creating a United Kingdom Supreme Court and explicitly protecting the rule of law. 
In Scotland, for example, the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, governed by the 
Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008, plays a role in appointments. That Act, by s 1, 
guarantees the continuation of judicial independence. The rule of law has been protected by 
statute to the extent that s 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that that Act does 
not adversely affect the rule of law.   
The final preventative provisions in the UN Convention relate to corruption in the private 
sector, money laundering and publicity and training. It is Article 12 that addresses corruption 
in the private sector. As above, the obligation is qualified with it inter alia being provided that 
parties shall “... where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, 
administrative or criminal penalties...”. Article 12(4) further requires parties to disallow the 
tax deductibility of corrupt payments required which, as noted above, the United Kingdom has 
done. Preventative provision in regard to money laundering is found in article 14 of the UN 
Convention. This is preventative in that requires financial institutions to adopt policies that may 
deter the practice. Article 14 requires the institution of a “comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions...”. Whilst the recent financial 
crisis suggests otherwise, the United Kingdom does contain a detailed regulatory regime. The 
Financial Action Task Force stated in June 2007: 
“The UK has a comprehensive legal structure to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. The money laundering offence is broad, fully covering the 
elements of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, and the number of prosecutions and 
convictions is increasing. The terrorist financing offence is also broad. The 
introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) has had a significant and 
positive impact on the UK’s ability to restrain, confiscate and recover proceeds of 
crime. The UK has also established an effective terrorist asset freezing regime. 
Overall, the UK FIU appears to be a generally effective FIU. The UK has designated a 
number of competent authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering 
offences. Measures for domestic and international cooperation are generally 
comprehensive as well.50
The Financial Services Authority is one of these authorities. Established under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, it has, under s 2(2)(d) a regulatory objective the reduction of 
financial crime. The Financial Services Authority inter alia implements the European Union’s 
Third Money Laundering Directive.
 
51
                                                          
49 The Scottish Procurement Policy Handbook, December 2008, section 4.1, cited at 
 Additional to the Financial Services Authority are HM 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/12/23151017/0. In regard to public procurement more 
generally, the lawful ability of the United Kingdom to affect a change in the law is restricted by the 
matter coming under the competence of the EU.  
50 Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, June 2007, para 2, cited at  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/33/20/38917272.pdf. FIU being an abbreviation of Financial 
Intelligence Unit.  
51 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, cited at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0015:01:EN:HTML. The Regulations 
require various concerns to register with HM Revenue and Customs, to have anti-money laundering 
policies in place and to report activity regarded as suspicious. See further, Powles, E., All That Glistens 
is not Gold: Laundering the UK Money Laundering Regime, (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 40. 
Revenue and Customs and the Serious Organised Crime Agency.52 The Financial Services 
Authority together with the National Policing Improvement Agency appear to meet the obligations 
in the areas of publicity and training within, inter alia, articles 13 and 60. In regard to the former, 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 provides as objectives of the Financial Services 
Authority public awareness and the reduction of financial crime.53
 
 In regard to the latter, the 
obligation to train persons fighting financial crime in article 60 is met by the National Policing 
Improvement Agency. The Serious Crime Act 2007 transferred to it the mandate of the now 
defunct Asset Recovery Agency on 1 April 2008. Overall, then, the United Kingdom appears to 
meet the international obligations that require the adoption of preventative policies and practices. It 
does so generally by containing rules, policies and institutions working towards the goal of 
preventing corruption and bribery but also through the fact that the obligations themselves in the 
UN Convention are largely open to qualification and restriction.  
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The United Kingdom’s criminalisation of bribery, together with its attempt to enforce it, has 
generated the most comment and criticism. What should be made clear, though, is that law 
that is opaque and incongruent (if that is what the law is – mentioned presently) is not 
necessarily at odds with international obligation.54 Indeed, the United Kingdom appears to be 
in general compliance with international law in regard to the criminalisation of relevant acts. 
The UN Convention’s bribery-specific proscriptive obligations are found in Chapter III 
entitled Criminalisation and Law Enforcement. Central here are articles 15 and 16 covering 
the bribery of and by national and foreign public officials. Article 15 has been noted above. It 
appears clear that that obligation and the others within the UN Convention in regard to the 
substantive criminal law are met. Admittedly, the various definitions of “bribe” within United 
Kingdom law are inconsistent and do not correlate with the international terminology. As seen 
above, the essence of bribery is an “undue reward” under common law, an inducement taking 
the form of a corrupt gift, loan, fee, reward or advantage under the 1889 Act, and an 
inducement being a gift or consideration under the 1916 Act. Within the UN Convention the 
core term is “undue advantage”. It is submitted this variation in terminology does not lead to 
United Kingdom non-compliance. The obligation in regard to the bribery of foreign public 
officials in article 16(1) is met through the extension of the law under the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, mentioned above. 
This extension also met the general obligation in the OECD Convention, within article 1, to 
prescribe the offering, promising or giving an “undue pecuniary or other advantage” of foreign 
officials.55 As the House of Lords noted in the BAE litigation, the enactment of ss 108 – 110 
of the 2001 Act “… gave effect to the United Kingdom's obligation under the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997)”.56
 
 
The question of United Kingdom compliance with the prescriptive obligations under the 
Council of Europe Convention is slightly more complex. Here it appears that the obligations 
have been met or reservations have been made. The general obligations, in Chapter II, require 
prescription of active and passive bribery in both the public and private sectors (articles 2, 3 7 and 
8 respectively). As noted above, ss 1(1) and 1(2) of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889, as amended, prescribe active and passive bribery in the public sector within and outwith 
                                                          
52 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 creates an onus on persons to disclose to the Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency certain information in regard to money laundering and the proceeds of crime, under ss 
327-334.  
53 By sections 4 and 6 respectively.  
54 The Law Commission for England and Wales has suggested that compliance with international law 
itself need not result in good law, stating “The mere fact that the United Kingdom currently complies with 
its international obligations in relation to extra-territorial acts of bribery does not mean that the current 
domestic law is satisfactory” Law Commission for England and Wales, Nov 2007 Report, at para 11.43. 
55 A lacuna in United Kingdom law is its failure to prescribe situations where a bribe is given to a third 
party, as required by article 1(1) of the OECD Convention, not the person whom it is sought to 
influence. See Williams, supra note 2 at p 204-205. 
56 At para 2. See in regard to Scotland, Arnell, P. The Crime of Bribery in Scotland, supra note 30.  
the United Kingdom. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, as amended, makes it a crime 
for an agent to accept or obtain a bribe, with an agent being anybody employed by or acting 
for another, whether in the public or private sector. This, in general terms, can be seen to meet 
the requirement of prescribing bribery in the private sector although its formulation is not 
ideal. Indeed the usage of the agent/principal concept has given rise to a number of criticisms. 
The most common relates to the applicability of the defense of principal consent under the 
Act. There are conflicting views on this point.57 However, the United Kingdom entered a 
reservation in regard to the active bribery private sector obligation in article 7 because the 
1906 Act does not prescribe the situation where benefit or advantage is given not to an agent 
acting on behalf of a principal but to a third party – which is required by article 7.58
 
 In general 
terms, then, the obligations in the Council of Europe Convention in regard to bribery-specific 
offences can be said to be met, albeit in a rather unsatisfactory fashion. 
United Kingdom law appears to comply with the requirements to prescribe various other acts 
related or tangential to bribery itself. Articles 17, 23 and 25 of the UN Convention cover 
embezzlement, money laundering and obstruction of justice respectively. The obligation in 
regard to embezzlement by a public official is met through by the law relating to theft 
generally. The criminalisation of money laundering is covered by all three conventions. In 
addition to article 23 of the UN Convention are articles 7 of the OECD Convention and 13 of the 
Council of Europe Convention. As mentioned above, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss 327 
– 329 criminalise money laundering. Through this Act the United Kingdom appears to meet the 
obligations upon it in this area. The obligation to criminalise the obstruction of justice is met, in 
English law, under common law and by statute. The common law crime of contempt of court 
covers the interference with those who have duties to discharge in court59 and it is also an 
offence at common law to attempt to pervert the course of justice.60 Section s 51 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 prescribes the intimidation of witnesses, jurors 
etcetera. Articles 18-20 of the UN Convention cover trading in influence, abuse of functions 
and illicit enrichment. As with certain of the preventative obligations mentioned above, these 
are non-compulsory. Here the obligation upon state parties is to “consider” adopting relevant 
legislation.61 This type of non-compulsory obligation also exists generally in regard to the 
private sector-related provisions within the UN Convention covering bribery and 
embezzlement and “concealment” in regard to both public and private sectors, in articles 21, 
22 and 24.62
 
  
The obligation to act in regard to crimes apart from bribery itself in the OECD Convention is 
limited to money laundering, discussed above. In the Council of Europe Convention there are 
further obligations. These include that in article 12 requiring state parties to criminalise 
trading in influence - the UN Convention also contains an obligation in this regard. As this 
crime is not found in United Kingdom law a reservation to the Council of Europe Convention 
has been made. The Explanatory Notes to the Council of Europe Convention state the 
reservation was made to because “… not all of the behaviour which falls under the definition of 
'trading in influence' in Article 12 is criminal” under the 1906 Act.63
                                                          
57 See OECD Report, supra note 4, at pp 12-14. 
 The Council of Europe 
Convention also mandates the criminalisation of the bribery of discreet groups of people 
including, under article 6, members of foreign public assemblies. The Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889 as amended, mentioned above, covers the bribery of foreign public 
bodies. The existing extended law also covers the obligations in articles 9 and 10 of the 
Council of Europe Convention in regard to the bribery of officials of international 
58 Reservations to the Council of Europe Convention are permitted under article 37. 
59 Re Johnson (1887) 20 Q.B.D. 68. 
60 See R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360. 
61 The crime of “trading in influence” is addressed below.  
62 As seen above, however, the crime of bribery in United Kingdom law does extend to some extent to 
the private sector, as indeed does embezzlement through the law of theft. Section 327(1)(a) of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 prescribes concealing of criminal property.  
63 Explanatory Memorandum on the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and 
the Additional Protocol, cited at http://www.fco.gov.uk. The obligation in the UN Convention is 
conditioned with “shall consider”.  
organisations and members of international parliamentary assemblies.  
 
The final two subjects to be mentioned under the heading substantive criminal law do not, 
in fact, concern the criminalisation of bribery or corruption or tangential activity. Rather, 
they concern the question of to whom or what that law is applied. The first point notes the 
limitation of criminal jurisdiction. The second matter relates to the extension of criminal 
liability to legal persons. In regard to the extension of jurisdiction, and similar to trading in 
influence in that the United Kingdom qualified its ratification, are two declarations under 
article 17 of the Council of Europe Convention, the jurisdictional article. Here the United 
Kingdom made a declaration under article 17(2) whereby it stated that the obligations 
within article 17 were not met. These were in article 17 paragraphs (b) and (c). Article 17b 
requires the extension of jurisdiction over officials and elected representatives, who are not 
necessarily United Kingdom nationals. Article 17c inter alia provides that jurisdiction is 
established where “the offence involves one of its public officials or members of its domestic 
public assemblies...”. The declaration was made in regard to the former provision because the 
law was extended to apply only to United Kingdom nationals, not non-nationals who may 
hold those roles. In regard to the latter “Article 17c provides for jurisdiction over cases 
'involving' (not necessarily committed by) nationals etc. It is not UK practice to exercise this 
type of jurisdiction and we do not intend to apply Article 17c”.64
 
 
The liability of legal persons is the final subject to be mentioned under this head. It is provided 
for in all three treaties; by article 26 of the UN Convention, article 2 of the OECD Convention 
and article 18 of the Council of Europe Convention. The OECD Working Group has stated in 
regard to corporate criminal liability “Overall, the Group is disappointed and seriously 
concerned with the unsatisfactory implementation of the Convention by the UK. The Working 
Group is particularly concerned that the UK’s continued failure to address deficiencies in its 
laws on bribery of foreign public officials and on corporate liability for foreign bribery has 
hindered investigations.65 Indeed the OECD Working group has on more than one occasion 
criticised the United Kingdom position in regard to corporate criminal liability, highlighting in 
2007 the “deficiencies” in the law on the liability of legal persons for foreign bribery.66 More 
specifically the Law Commission in its 2007 Report highlighted the fact that corporate liability 
does not extend to legal persons incorporated under the law of a Crown Dependency or Overseas 
Territory, to the situation where a British company assists or encourages to commit bribery a 
foreign national who is not employed by that company and where a United Kingdom incorporated 
company assist a foreign company including a foreign subsidiary company to commit 
extraterritorial bribery even where the assistance or encouragement occurs in England and 
Wales.67 Clearly have been, and remain, legitimate concerns in regard to corporate criminality. 
These, of course, transcend bribery and corruption and apply more generally.68
                                                          
64 Ibid. The reservations have been extended apply until December 2010.  
 However, it should 
be noted that these concerns relate to putative deficiencies in the criminal law per se, and not its 
non-compliance with international legal obligation. An examination of the specific obligations 
within the treaties reveals that they are either non-obligatory or non-criminal specific. Within the 
UN Convention the obligation is conditioned with the phrase that state parties “… shall adopt such 
65 OECD Phase 2 bis Report, October 2008, supra note 3 at page 1. The other criticisms referred to 
include those relating to the general opacity of the law and the principal consent defence. 
66 (OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2007, http://www.oecd.org, [Accessed on 
23.06.2008] p. 24)   
67 Ibid at para 11.43. Further, the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development 
Fourth Report, entitled “Corruption” published March 2001 criticised the fact that the Government had 
yet to introduce legislation to implement the OECD Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions after current legislation was found to be inadequate by 
the OECD. It stated “simple and clear legislation should be brought forward as a matter of urgency”, 
Executive Summary, cited at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmintdev/39/3902.htm.  
68 There is a wealth of writing here, see generally Wells, C., Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 
2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. The Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter 
Act 2007 addresses the issue in a crime-specific way, see in regard to it Ormerod, D., and Taylor, R., 
Legislative Comment, 2008 Criminal Law Review 589. 
measures that may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles…”. The OECD Convention 
provides somewhat similarly, “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a 
foreign public official”. As United Kingdom “legal principles” stand, there are difficulties with the 
notion of the liability of companies.  The Council of Europe Convention, on the other hand, does 
require the imposition of liability but does not explicitly state that this be criminal.69
 
 Overall, then, 
the position of the United Kingdom in regard to substantive criminal law and jurisdiction and 
liability of legal persons appears to be in compliance with the international obligations upon it.  
PROCEDURAL CO-OPERATION 
 
In regard to international procedural co-operation, as with preventative and substantive provision, 
the UN Convention is the most detailed of the treaties imposing obligations upon the United 
Kingdom. Articles 43-50, within Chapter IV entitled International Cooperation, cover a general 
obligation to co-operate, extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of sentenced persons and 
criminal proceedings, law enforcement co-operation, joint investigations and special investigative 
techniques. Also relevant under this head are Chapters V and VI, entitled Asset Recovery and 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange.70
 
 As above, it must be noted that a number of 
these provisions are couched in non-obligatory terms. For example article 48 inter alia provides 
“States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic 
legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat 
the offences covered by this Conventions…”. This is not true, however, in regard to the general 
obligation to co-operate in article 43. It provides “States Parties shall cooperate in criminal matters 
in accordance with articles 44 to 50 of this Convention”. Similarly state parties are bound to 
provide mutual legal assistance by article 46(1), it providing “States Parties shall afford one 
another the widest measure of legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in relation to the offences covered by this convention”. Whilst less thorough, Chapter 
IV of the Council of Europe Convention, entitled International Co-operation mirrors the UN 
Convention, providing a general obligation to co-operate, for mutual assistance, extradition, and 
communication. There are two relevant articles in this area in the OECD Convention, articles 9 and 
10, covering mutual legal assistance and extradition respectively.   
The obligation in regard to mutual assistance in the UN Convention in article 46 is detailed, 
containing thirty paragraphs. The United Kingdom law governing mutual legal assistance is 
found in a number of statues – central of which are the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 
2003 and Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990. Comparison of international 
obligation and this provision leads to the conclusion that United Kingdom law is in 
compliance with the obligations upon it. Further, it is material to note the existence of a large 
number of bilateral and multilateral agreements to which the United Kingdom is party in the 
area of mutual legal assistance generally. A bilateral example being the Treaty between the 
Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1994.71
                                                          
69 See Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Explanatory Report, 2000, 
Council of Europe, p 55.  
 Multilaterally there are a number 
of international and European treaties, decisions and agreements in the area of mutual 
assistance in criminal matters generally and specifically in regard to drugs and organised 
crime. Amongst these are the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000 and 
the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. Of course the existence of agreements and provision akin to that in the UN 
Convention and Council of Europe Convention in the area of mutual assistance does not in 
itself support compliance. It does, though, indicate the United Kingdom’s position. 
Regardless, the existence of an agreement is not a condition precedent for United Kingdom 
co-operation with a judicial authority abroad, with it being noted “The UK can provide most 
70 As certain of these subjects relate more directly to enforcement and investigation they will be discussed 
in the subsequent section.  
71 UKTS 0661/1997 Cmnd 3783. For a list of current bilateral mutual assistance treaties see 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/treaties/lists-treaties/bilateral-mutual-legal. 
forms of legal assistance without bilateral or international agreements - but assistance in the 
restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime is dependent upon a bilateral agreement or 
other international agreement”.72 Where agreement is requisite, the Crime (International Co-
operation) Act 2003 provides the legislative framework and underpinning. In large part it replaced 
the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, and was inter alia enacted to meet the 
requirements of the mutual legal assistance provisions of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention 1985 and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000 and the 
Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2001.73
 
  
In regard to mutual assistance specifically, a number of statutory instruments have 
supplemented the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 including, in regard to Scotland 
generally, the Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules Amendment) (Miscellaneous) 200474 
and, in regard to restraining orders on dealing with property specified in overseas requests in 
Scotland, the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (Enforcement of Overseas 
Forfeiture Orders)(Scotland) Order 2005.75 In England and Wales the Criminal Justice 
(International Co-operation) Act 1990 (Enforcement of Overseas Forfeiture Orders) Order 
200576 provides similarly to the latter. The United Kingdom law in the area of asset recovery is 
found in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Serious Crime Act 2007. Exercising the 
powers created by the Acts is the Serious Organised Crime Agency, under s 4 and Schedule 8 
of the Serious Crime Act 2007. This provision exists in addition to that in regard to 
international restraint and recovery, mentioned above. It is Part 11 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 that governs international requests in the area of asset recovery.77
 
  
The law of extradition in the United Kingdom law has relatively recently been reformed and is 
now governed by the Extradition Act 2003.78 It creates two main schemes, one in regard to those 
states in which a relatively high degree of trust is placed, called Category 1 states, and another with 
which it has an extradition treaty, called Category 2. The obligation upon the United Kingdom 
under the treaties to make the crimes of bribery and corruption extraditable is clearly met. To be 
so, in general terms, they must be included in the European Framework List of offences in regard 
to Category 1 states or attract a sufficient possible punishment in regard to Category 2. The 
European Framework List, found in Schedule 2 to the 2003 Act, lists “corruption” in section 7. 
“Swindling” and money laundering are also found on the List. In regard to Category 2 states 
section 137(2)(b) provides that an offence is an extradition offence if “... the conduct would 
constitute an offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom punishable 
with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater 
punishment if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom”. Again, this is met in United 
Kingdom law – the penalties for an offence under the 1889 Act, for example, include 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years.79
 
 The Bribery Bill introduced in March 
2009 stipulates a maximum period of ten years imprisonment where a person is tried on 
indictment, under clause 11(1).  
In regard to the transfer of sentenced persons the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984, as amended 
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by the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, 
applies.80 The Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 enables prisoners to serve their sentences in 
their own country where there is an international agreement in place allowing for such a 
transfer. As with mutual assistance, illustrating the general approach of the United Kingdom is 
the fact it is party to a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements in the area. The United 
Kingdom is party to two multilateral prisoner transfer agreements, the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 1983 and its Protocol and the 
Commonwealth Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders 1990. An example of a 
bilateral agreement is the Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on the Transfer of Prisoners 2002.81
 
 The 
precise terms on which a prisoner's sentence is administered following such a transfer are 
governed by the specific international arrangements in place between the United Kingdom and 
the country with whom any transfer is taking place. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 introduced further amendments which provide the legislative framework for the 
enforcement of sentences where prisoners have fled to or from the United Kingdom. Overall, 
it is clear that the United Kingdom meets its international obligations in this area.  
The situation in regard to the transference of criminal proceedings is different to that of the 
transference of prisoners. Three points should be made here. Firstly, that where it is thought 
by United Kingdom prosecuting authorities that a greater connection exists between a criminal 
act and a foreign state, and that state seeks the person through extradition, he/she will 
normally be subjected to extradition proceedings – even if a United Kingdom national – 
barring statutory restrictions such as those based on double jeopardy, human rights and the 
death penalty. Indeed there have been several cases in recent times where this has happened – 
in the face of the opposition of the persons involved.82 Secondly, the obligation in regard to 
the transfer of criminal proceedings in article 47 of the UN Convention is non-obligatory. It 
inter alia provides “States Parties shall consider the possibility of transferring...”. Thirdly, 
there has been prosecutorial agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom in 
regard to the assumption of judicial jurisdiction. This is the Attorney General and Lord 
Advocate’s Guidance for Handling Criminal Cases with Concurrent Jurisdiction between the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America.83 This is an attempt to enhance 
prosecutorial co-operation between the two states.84
 
 It is clear that the United Kingdom is in 
compliance with its international obligations in regard to the transference of criminal 
proceedings.  
UNITED KINGDOM LAW COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
Enforcement issues, as much as the substantive law itself, has been behind many of the criticisms 
of the United Kingdom. These have generally related to the low number of investigations and, in 
particular, successful prosecutions of bribery cases having a foreign element. Indeed it was only on 
22 August 2008 that the first conviction for foreign bribery occurred. Here a director of a UK-
based company pleaded guilty to making corrupt payments to foreign officials and was 
convicted under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.85
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managing director of CBRN Team, a United Kingdom security company, who paid £83,000 in 
bribes in 2007-2008 to two Ugandan officials in relation to a £210,000 contract. He received a 
five-month jail sentence suspended for one year.86 Also relatively recently, in October 2008 
the Serious Fraud Office obtained its first ever Civil Recovery Order against Balfour Beatty 
relating to irregular payments and questionable accounting practices made by a subsidiary of 
the company in Egypt with the company agreeing to surrender £2.25 million.87 Whilst notable, 
this record of successful enforcement pales in comparison to that of the United States – which 
has been active for some considerable time in applying its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1974. 
United Kingdom enforcement efforts have engendered criticism from a number of quarters 
including non-governmental organisations, the OECD and the Select Committee on 
International Development. Nicholas Hildyard from the Corner House, an anti-corruption non-
governmental organisation, stated in November 2008 “Far from encouraging a political 
environment that encourages anti-corruption efforts, successive governments have actively 
tolerated (and even allowed to flourish) an environment that is hostile to such efforts”.88 The 
same organisation has identified a number of United Kingdom-based companies operating 
abroad where corruption allegations have been made. They include PowerGen in regard to the 
Paiton II Power Project in Indonesia, AES Ltd in regard to the Bujagli Hydroelectric Project in 
Uganda and Keir International in regard to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in Lesotho.89
 
  
The OECD has also been critical of the United Kingdom’s enforcement efforts. In a Report 
following the ending of the BAE investigation it stated: 
“The Working Group is particularly concerned that the UK‘s continued failure to 
address deficiencies in its laws on bribery of foreign public officials and on corporate 
liability for foreign bribery has hindered investigations... The Group also strongly 
regrets the uncertainty about the UK‘s commitment to establish an effective corporate 
liability regime in accordance with the Convention, as recommended in 2005, and 
urges the UK to adopt appropriate legislation as a matter of high priority. The Report 
finds that the unsatisfactory treatment of certain cases since the 2005 Phase 2 report 
has revealed systemic deficiencies, including the uncertainty over the application of 
Article 5 to all stages of the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases, and 
the hurdle created by the special Attorney General consent requirement for foreign 
bribery prosecutions. The Report finds that these issues should be addressed and that 
the independence of the Serious Fraud Office should be strengthened. The Working 
Group also recommends that the UK ensure that the SFO attributes a high priority to 
foreign bribery cases and has sufficient resources to address such cases effectively”.90
Finally, the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report 
22 March 2001 stated “The Committee criticises the fact that the Government has yet to 
introduce legislation to implement the OECD Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions after current legislation was found to be 
inadequate by the OECD. Simple and clear legislation should be brought forward as a matter 
of urgency. Legislation exists to control money laundering but it is unclear who enforces it 
and in what circumstances it is enforced. Corruption and money laundering cannot be tackled 
effectively without better coordination across Government”.
 
91
 
 
The point to note here in adjudging United Kingdom compliance in regard to enforcement of 
the law in cases where there is a foreign element is firstly that non-existence, ineffective or 
otherwise deficient attempts at enforcement are not necessarily unlawful in international law. 
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Non-compliance will only arise where there are mandatory obligations upon the United 
Kingdom to legislate or act in a certain way and it has failed to do so. The obligations upon 
the United Kingdom in regard to the enforcement of laws in the area of bribery are relatively 
succinct. The pre-eminent obligation is found in article 5 of the OECD Convention, noted 
above. It in essence provides that investigation and prosecution of bribery of a foreign public 
official shall not be affected by considerations of national economic interest, relations with 
other States or the identity of persons involved. Also noted above, a further somewhat similar 
provision is found in article 30(3) of the UN Convention. It provides that state parties endeavour 
to ensure that discretionary prosecutorial powers are exercised to maximise law enforcement. 
In a related vein are the obligations upon the United Kingdom to contain or otherwise 
establish enforcement bodies. Article 36 of the UN Convention, for example, provides “Each 
State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the 
existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law 
enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to 
carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of 
such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their 
tasks”.92
 
 Of course one is not able to make definitive comment upon decisions not to prosecute 
on specific occasions. Clearly one would need to weigh the relevant evidence in all the 
circumstances. The relatively few prosecutions militates in favour of the arguments made by 
non-governmental organisations that the United Kingdom has been tolerant, or turned a blind-
eye, to overseas corruption. To state that it has been acting in violation of its international 
obligations generally however, is a conclusion too-far. What is reasonable however, is to focus 
on the issues raised in article 36 of the UN Convention, – prosecutorial independence 
(political non-interference) and resourcing. As will be seen, both these issues to a greater or 
lesser extent affect United Kingdom enforcement in the BAE case as well as more generally.  
BAE LITIGATION  
 
The origins of the BAE litigation are found in “Al-Yamamah”, the biggest arms deal in United 
Kingdom history which dates to 1985. It is a contract between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia where BAE Systems is the main contractor. The value of Al-Yamamah exceeded £43 
billion and inter alia involved the sale of 72 Tornado fighters and 50 Hawk jet trainers and the 
construction of two airbases.93 The agreement was renewed in 1993 and 2005 despite 
allegations of corruption.94
“... expressed the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious 
 The allegations led to the commencement of an investigation by 
the SFO under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 on 29 July 2004. Underlying the investigation were 
possible breaches the law proscribing corrupt payments to public officials outside the United 
Kingdom. When the SFO investigation attempted to access certain banking information from 
Swiss authorities there followed an explicit threat from Saudi Arabia to withdraw from counter-
terrorist and strategic objective co-operation and end negotiations for the purchase of Typhoon 
aircraft. The response to this threat culminated in a “personal minute” to the Attorney General 
from Tony Blair dated 8 December 2006 asking him to reconsider the public interest issues 
raised by the ongoing investigation. On 14 December 2006 the Director’s decision to discontinue 
the investigation was announced. It inter alia stated that the decision had been taken “... 
following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director of 
the SFO concerning the need to safeguard national and international security. It has been 
necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the wider public interest. No 
weight has been given to commercial interests or to the national economic interest”. The 
Attorney General stated the same day in Parliament that the Prime Minister and the Foreign and 
Defence Secretaries had:  
                                                          
92 Of course the United Kingdom is under an obligation under article 26 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969 to carry out its international obligations in good faith.  
93 The arms deal they called the dove: how Britain grasped the biggest prize, The Guardian,  15 
December 2006, cited at http://www.guardian.co.uk.  
94 In October 2006, The Guardian published documents showing how price of Tornado warplanes was 
inflated by £600m. See The secrets of Britain's arms trade, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
damage to the UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation, which is likely 
to have seriously negative consequences for the United Kingdom public interest in terms 
of both national security and our highest priority foreign policy objectives in the 
Middle East. The heads of our security and intelligence agencies and our ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia share this assessment.95
He noted that article 5 of the OECD Convention precluded him and the SFO from taking into 
account considerations of the national economic interest or the potential effect upon relations with 
another state and that this had not happened. 
  
 
The decision to discontinue the investigation was challenged by way of judicial review by two 
non-governmental organisations, the Corner House Research and the Campaign Against Arms 
Trade in the High Court. Two core arguments can be identified. That submission to the threat made 
by Saudi Arabia was itself unlawful and that article 5 of the OECD Convention was 
misinterpreted and misapplied by the Director. On 10 April 2008 the Divisional Court granted 
judicial review and quashed the decision of the Director. Lord Justice Moses and Justice Sullivan 
upheld the first argument made by the claimants. The bases of their decision were the 
principles of the rule of law and separation of powers. In regard to the former the Court stated: 
“The courts protect the rule of law by upholding the principle that when making decisions 
in the exercise of his statutory power an independent prosecutor is not entitled to 
surrender to the threat of a third party, even when that third party is a foreign state. The 
courts are entitled to exercise their own judgement as to how best they may protect the 
rule of law, even in cases where it is threatened from abroad. In the exercise of that 
judgment we are of the view that a resolute refusal to buckle to such a threat is the only 
way the law can resist”.96
In regard to the separation of powers the High Court stated it “… requires the courts to resist 
encroachment on the territory for which they are responsible. In the instant application, the 
Government's response has failed to recognise that the threat uttered was not simply directed at 
this country's commercial, diplomatic and security interests; it was aimed at its legal 
system”.
 
97 The High Court ruled in needn’t make judgement on article 5 of the OECD 
Convention because “... under conventional domestic law principles” the Director's decision was 
unlawful it was not necessary.98
 
 
On 30 July 2008 the House of Lords overturned the High Court’s decision. Two points of law of 
general public interest had been certified - whether the Director had acted lawfully in 
surrendering to the threat and whether he had been correct in believing he was acting consistently 
with article 5. In regard to the first question the House of Lords took the orthodox approach to the 
exercise of discretion. It held that the question the Divisional Court should have addressed was “... 
whether, in deciding that the public interest in pursuing an important investigation into alleged 
bribery was outweighed by the public interest in protecting the lives of British citizens, the 
Director made a decision outside the lawful bounds of the discretion entrusted to him by 
Parliament”.99
 “The issue in these proceedings is not whether his decision is right or wrong, nor 
whether the Divisional Court or the House agrees with it, but whether it was a decision 
which the Director was lawfully entitled to make. Such an approach involves no affront 
to the rule of law, to which the principles of judicial review give effect. In the opinion of 
the House the Director’s decision was one he was lawfully entitled to make. It may indeed 
be doubted whether a responsible decision-make would, on the facts before the 
Director, have decided otherwise”.
 The House of Lords disagreed with the approach taken by the High Court, stating: 
100
In accordance with the High Court the House of Lords did not address the effect of the OECD 
Convention. In the leading judgment Lord Bingham held that it was “unnecessary and 
undesirable” to address the issue of whether article 5 of the OECD Convention prohibits the 
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inclusion of “multiple loss of life” within the definition of “relations with another state” and so 
is a factor which must not influence investigation and prosecution of corruption and bribery. 
Lord Bingham noted “The extreme difficulty of resolving this problem on a principled basis...”, 
and said that this was a factor in favour of deferring to the mechanism within the Convention 
itself providing for its interpretation.101 He said it was clear that the Director thought that article 5 
did allow him to take into account threats to human life as a relevant consideration and that 
the Director unequivocally stated that he would have made the same decision even if he had 
believed that it was incompatible with article 5.102
 
 
Clearly the attempted prosecution of BAE Systems and subsequent litigation raise in sharp relief 
the difficult issues faced by courts and governments in prosecuting certain cases of bribery and 
corruption with an international and governmental dimension. It is through prosecution, rather than 
prescription itself, that “hard cases” will arise and in this case have arisen. The question to be 
answered presently is whether the United Kingdom was complying with its international 
obligations in the case. As seen, both the High Court and the House of Lords did not address the 
issue. For the OECD’s part, the Working Group on Bribery in its 2007 Annual Report states “At 
its first meeting after the announcement of the United Kingdom’s discontinuance of the BAE 
Al Yamamah investigation, the Working Group expressed serious concerns about whether the 
decision was consistent with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”.103 In its March 2008 
Report the OECD Working Group discussed the BAE Systems case in some detail. In it it 
refuted suggestions made by United Kingdom authorities in the High Court and House of 
Lords that it has interpreted article 5 in broad and general terms to either include or exclude 
national security as a factor that can not affect prosecutorial decisions.104
“In light of Article 5 and the proper role of the government, prosecutors should resist 
dropping a case, unless, after strict scrutiny, they are satisfied that, under the 
circumstances, sufficient efforts have been made to explore and use other options or 
there are compelling reasons why efforts should not be made. While the House of 
Lords found that the Director‘s reliance on the Ambassador was acceptable in the 
context of the requirements of domestic law, which provides the Director with broad 
discretion, the examiners consider that Article 5 requires a more searching approach in 
foreign bribery cases where Article 5 factors are strongly present”.
 It then noted that the 
decision making process leading to the termination of the investigation did not take sufficient 
cognisance of article 5: 
105
It concluded, although without stating explicitly, that the discontinuance of the investigation and 
prosecution were in contravention with the OECD Convention’s obligations: 
 
“The lead examiners recall that the Working Group expressed serious concerns in 
January and March 2007 about whether the Al Yamamah discontinuance was 
consistent with the Convention. They consider that the new developments since then, 
including the additional information gathered in the context of the on-site visit and 
provided in connection with the judicial review proceeding, have reinforced and 
intensified the serious concerns with regard to its consistency with the Convention. 
They do not believe that the decision of the House of Lords in the Al Yamamah case 
allays these concerns”.106
In holding that the cessation of the prosecution of BAE Systems was in violation of the 
Convention the Working Group fails to specifically address the question of whether national 
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security is encompassed by article 5 and the term “relations with another State”.107 Rather, being 
relatively muted in its criticism, it focuses on the failure to explore alternatives to prosecution and 
the manner and nature of ministerial input into the decision through the use of a Shawcross 
Exercise.108
 
  
The view of the Working Group on Bribery, whilst authoritative, is not determinative of the 
legality of the United Kingdom’s actions. Its terms of reference are set out in Section VIII of the 
1997 Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business 
Transactions. This provides inter alia that the Working Group “reviews” steps to implementation 
and examines “specific issues relating to bribery in international business transactions”. It does 
not pronounce on the nature of the conclusions of these examinations or reviews. The 
academic commentary on the decision is mixed. Williams writes “In relation to the SFO 
investigation into the Al-Yamamah contracts, it is not clear whether the termination of the 
investigation on the grounds of ‘national and international security’ was in compliance with 
the UK's obligations under the OECD Convention”.109 In regard to the question of national 
security and article 5 more generally Williams says academic opinion is largely opposed to 
allowing national security to be an exception to article 5.110 Rodmell appears to agree stating “The 
decision in December 2006 of the Director of the SFO to terminate the investigation into the 
affairs of British Aerospace Systems plc (BAeS) as far as they relate to the Al Yamamah 
defence contract on grounds of national and international security seems to put at risk a 
fundamental principle of the OECD 1997 Convention”.111 On the other hand, again as Williams 
notes, the first sentence of article 5 suggests some latitude, providing “... that the investigation 
and prosecution of an offence should be subject to the laws of a State Party, which in the UK 
permit the taking into account of ‘ public interest’  considerations, including international 
relations”.112 Of course the above analysis assumes that the decision to stop the prosecution 
was indeed on the basis of national security. This is put into question by a comment by the 
former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in defending the Government's decision to terminate the 
investigation. He stated that the investigation was dropped to prevent the “wreckage of a vital 
strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and the loss of British jobs”.113 Clearly if the decision 
was taken for economic reasons then the United Kingdom would have acted in direct 
contravention of article 5. On the assumption that national security was indeed a material 
factor behind the decision, and in light of the absence of an authoritative or detailed 
interpretation of the meaning of article 5 by the Working Group or elsewhere, it is submitted 
that the decision was not clearly unlawful.114
 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
United Kingdom compliance with international law in the area of bribery and corruption 
requires examination of many and diverse facets of its law and procedure. It is clearly not as 
simple as testing narrow substantive criminal prescriptions against a specific treaty obligation. 
The existence of three treaties covering a wide range of areas makes overall judgement 
difficult. As seen, the United Kingdom has a range of preventative, substantive and procedural 
                                                          
107 At para 133 the OECD Report states “However, assuming solely for purposes of analysis that 
national security could constitute an exception under Article 5 as the UK suggests, the Al Yamamah 
case would then conceivably present a situation in which a prosecutor was being advised to drop a 
major case based on both Article 5 and non-Article 5 factors”, supra note 4, emphasis theirs. 
108 Ibid at para 167. A Shawcross Exercise entails the taking of views from relevant Ministers in order to 
come to a decision of whether or not it is in the public interest to continue with a prosecution. 
109 Williams, S., supra note 2 at para 205.  
110 Ibid, citing P Cullen, Article 5: Enforcement, in M Pieth, L Low and P Cullen (eds), The OECD 
Convention on Bribery: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007 at 322. 
111 Rodmell, G., Corruption - economic crime or economic reality?, (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 259 at 
260. 
112 Williams, S., supra note 2 at p 206. 
113 Quoted by Williams, ibid, and cited at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page11882. 
114 Williams notes the existence of a national security exception in the application of international 
obligations is far from uncommon, but that in most cases where present it is explicitly provided for ,ibid 
at p 206.  
rules and practices and it has prosecuted and attempted to prosecute persons or companies 
thought to have infringed the law. As noted, the OECD and others are of the view that United 
Kingdom substantive law is lacking. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the piecemeal and 
anachronistic nature of the law. The crimes “… certainly do not represent a coherent statutory 
regime: the terminology is inconsistent, they contain overlapping offences and core issues such as 
the elements of “corruptly” and “agency” remain ill-defined”.115 Indeed the general opacity of the 
law has been subjected to criticism for more than a decade, with the Law Commission for 
England and Wales, in 1997 stating that it “… found the law on corruption uncertain and 
inconsistent and proposed in a Consultation Paper issued in 1997 that it be comprehensively 
restated and updated by the enactment of a new statutory bribery offence”.116
 
 However, 
imperfect law is not necessarily at odds with international obligation. It may be in contrast to 
the spirit of international regulation but it is not materially non-compliant with it. This is the 
correct view – United Kingdom law and practice is not in breach of international law, it is, 
however, far from ideal. 
As important as the substantive criminal law in meeting international obligations are concerted, 
well-resourced investigative and prosecutorial activities. Indeed, in the context of fraud generally 
Scanlan suggests that new legislation may not be needed, but rather what is required are adequate 
resources to apply existing law. He writes of the “legislative obsession” of recent governments, “This 
obsession has led to a plethora of statutory provisions which has been indifferently or 
unsuccessfully enforced on the part of the relevant enforcement authorities”.117 Sufficient 
resources, increased political independence118
 
 and renewed vigour on the part of the 
prosecutorial authorities is what is required to address the poor record of successful 
prosecutions for bribery and corruption with an international element. Indeed, the recent 
enhancement of the activity of the Serious Fraud Office appears to meet many criticisms of the 
United Kingdom. Generally it has been the weak and inconsistent enforcement of extant law 
that has led to the most stringent criticisms of the United Kingdom - not its substantive law. 
Of course the two are related, it being easier for the prosecutorial authorities to apply clear and 
simple provisions. Even so, a fully resourced, supported, dedicated and independent 
prosecutorial authority would go some considerable way towards the United Kingdom 
satisfying its critics. Indeed, the recent decision to seek to again prosecute BAE Systems for 
bribery may start the process of repairing the reputation of the United Kingdom and moving it 
to a position where not only is the letter of international law complied with but also its spirit.   
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